Xiran Chen, Ph.D.
Data
Paramount Chiefs in Ghana
Chiefs are important local leaders who influence how people votes in Africa. This dataset collects key information of all paramount chiefs in Ghana since the first general election in the Fourth Republic (1992), including the location of the chief palace, the years in which the chieftaincy title became vacant and the new chiefs were installed, and the years in which a chieftaincy title was elevated to paramountcy and/or deregistered in the National House of Chiefs. This dataset helps examine important questions regarding the political outcomes of traditional institutions, such as election behaviors, public goods provision, and political violence.
Election Violence in Ghana
This dataset focuses on violence incidents that took place before, during, and after the general elections in Ghana. It records event information including the date, actors and targets, location, and form of violence. The data collection relies on various sources of information, especially local sources in Ghana. As a result, the EVIG dataset has a more comprehensive coverage of events in Ghana in comparison with existing cross-national datasets of election violence.
Publications
Chen, Xiran. 2024. "Local Aspirants and Politicised Chieftaincy Disputes: Evidence from Northern Ghana." Africa Spectrum. Online First. doi:10.1177/00020397241271303.
Abstract: Why do politicians intervene in some chieftaincy succession disputes but not others? The key actors and their motivations in these processes remain understudied. In this article I leverage a comparative analysis of two similar chieftaincy disputes in Ghana's Upper West Region, and develop inductively a theory of local aspirants – political actors with dual memberships in chieftaincy and politics. I find that local aspirants from disputing factions that seek to change the status quo of the dispute have particular interests in politicising the chieftaincy disputes. These findings contribute to our knowledge about how chieftaincy disputes become politicised, by emphasising the roles played by politicians embedded in chieftaincy.
Chen, Xiran. 2024. “Chiefs and Pre-Election Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Precolonial Legacy of Centralized States.” International Interactions 50 (3): 537–66. doi:10.1080/03050629.2024.2347214.
Abstract: This paper examines how African chiefs shape pre-election violence (PEV) locally. I argue that chiefs with greater capability of voter coordination, which stems from precolonial centralized states, reduce local risk of PEV. Utilizing existing and original data, I find that precolonial centralized states have a negative effect on PEV in Anglophone Africa, where precolonial institutions have been better preserved. This relationship is robust to a series tests, including two-stage least squares regressions. The findings contribute to our knowledge of how local political actors shape violent campaign strategies and of the diverse (pre-)colonial legacies in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Selected Working Papers
"Chiefdoms and Electoral Solidarity: Evidence from Ghana."
Abstract: How do traditional institutions affect electoral solidarity in Sub-Saharan Africa? I argue that the more chiefdoms in an electoral district, the lower electoral solidarity the district will obtain. During national elections, African chiefs usually act as vote brokers within their chiefdoms. The formal institutions of electoral district are nonetheless in tension with the informal institutions of chiefdoms, as some districts have more chiefdoms than the others. A greater number of chiefs in an electoral district increases the opportunity that political parties/candidates compete for chiefly support. It becomes difficult for any single political party/candidate to monopolize that support. Thus, electoral solidarity in such districts tend to be lower. I test this argument with existing and original data from Ghana, including a unique dataset of Ghanaian paramount chiefs.
"Government Violence in Post-Conflict Elections." (With Jessica Maves Braithwaite)
Abstract: When do incumbents use violence to influence electoral outcomes in the post-conflict context? We argue that domestic conflict dynamics and heightened international involvement shape incumbents’ motivations and the constraints on their electoral strategies. Drawing from various measures of electoral violence, our analysis generates three major findings. First, parity between government and rebel strength is associated with higher risk of pro-government electoral violence. Second, conflicts ending in victory experience higher likelihood of such violence. Lastly, UN missions involving peacekeeping troops are more effective than political initiatives in reducing the risk of pro-government electoral violence. Our findings speak to the complexities facing democratization and peacekeeping efforts in post-conflict societies.